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Abstract
This paper will attempt to examine the pitfalls of non-recognition through an examination
of China in the 1940s and 50s. China in this era faced many challenges ranging from war with
foreign powers, issues of economic development, and poor relations with its neighbors in
addition to its lack of UN membership and formal diplomatic recognition. In the absence of high
level diplomatic relations with many nations and UN membership, the main venue for Chinese
diplomacy was international conferences such as the Bandung and Geneva Conferences. This
paper will argue for the use of such conferences both as a status enhancer and venue for the
advancement of foreign policy goals in the absence of normative diplomatic relations.
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Introduction

China is one of the leading rising powers in the international relations sphere of the
present. Its status as the worlds foremost manufacturing center and preeminent power in East
Asia is unquestioned by most. However, China has not always been the force in international
relations that we now recognize it to be. It is easy, given China’s recognition as a superpower, to
overlook the fact that during much of the Cold War China was seen by the United States and
many of its allies as renegade, outside the sphere of normative international relations.
From 1949 until 1971, Communist China did not have a seat at the table— it was
excluded from United Nations, a stark contrast to modern China’s permanent membership on the
Security Council and veto power. In addition, from 1949 until 1979, it was not formally
recognized by the United States. International Relations scholarship tells us that “foreign
recognition is necessary for a state’s sovereign status internationally.”1 But a close study of
Chinese foreign policy of this era undermines this notion of recognition as a vital prerequisite for
meaningful membership in the international community.
Many scholars regard foreign recognition as a given; that it is a right of statehood, a intra
rather than international issue. Essentially that the recognition of a state indicates that the entity
possesses the qualities of a state. If the governing body collects taxes, exercises control over its
territory, then it will be recognized internationally as a state and granted membership in the
international community. But this is a narrow formulation that ignores the prescriptive role of
great powers in the process of recognition, and leaves no room for the use of recognition as a
Fabry, Mikulas, Recognizing States: International Society and the Establishement of New States since 1776, (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2010), 17.
1
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stick to beat would be nations with as the United States did in the case of China. If there can be
said to be a “family of nations,” then recognition is not merely an intra state issue. “The creation
of effective structures of power and domestic authority is not enough,” says Mikulas Fabry.2
China in this era was either not able to entice the United States into formal recognition or
felt that the benefits of recognition were not so strong as to make enticing the United States
palatable. Why bother? For much of this time, Communist China was regarded as a menace by
the United States. This points towards nonrecognition of China as a deliberate strategy on the
part of the United States to delegitimize Communist China in the international sphere, to deprive
China of being a “full and equal member of the society of states.”3 IR scholarship tells us that un
recognized states have historically experienced a wide range of negative consequences as a direct
result of their non-recognized status. These include the inability to carry out normal diplomatic
and economic relations, denial of membership in international organizations, and the inability to
sign certain international treaties.4 According to Fabry, the most serious consequence of non
recognition is that “those who find themselves in this position are exposed to being forcibly
displaced from their territory by a state which is recognized.”5
It seems relevant to also define clearly the concept of status in international relations, as it
is another knock on effect of non-recognition. Status is a series of beliefs about a given state’s
various attributes relating to wealth, soft power, and diplomatic clout to speak of but a few. It

2Fabry,

Recognizing States, 23.

3Fabry,

Recognizing States, 23.

4

Fabry, Recognizing States, 26.

5Fabry,

Recognizing States, 26.
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manifests itself as both “membership in a club of defined actors, and as relative standing within
such a club.”6 Recognition is an essential aspect of membership in this international society, and
as such, a state’s status is shrunk by non-recognition. High status in international society, which
the United States hoped to deprive China of, has positive benefits which include “the right to
play a part in determining international norms,” as well as “issues that affect the peace and
security of the international system.”7 High status states are deferred to by lower status states,
tangible good that benefits the interests of the high status states. “The assurance that others will
acknowledge, respect, and defer to a state’s special interests, not only in crises but in everyday
interactions, is highly valued by major powers.”8 The more relative status a state enjoys, the
more other states will adjust their policies to accommodate the interests of the high status state.
I argue that much of China’s anxieties and foreign policy were driven in part by their non
recognized status. That anxieties over being deprived of institutional membership drive their
actions in Bandung and the Geneva conference, and that security concerns at the outset of the
Korean War were heightened on account of their non-recognized status. The primary method
with which China sought to minimize the negative consequences of their non recognized status
was to enhance its status in the international sphere. By becoming a high status power in the
realm of East Asian politics at the Bandung conference, they hoped to render deliberate nonrecognition by the United States both ineffective as a foreign policy tool and eventually
untenable.
6Fabry,.

Recognizing States 33.

7Paul,

T. V., Deborah Welch Larson, and William C. Wohlforth, Status in World Politics (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2014), 48.
8Paul,

Larson, and Wohlforth, Status in World Politics, 53.

!4
I hope to explore how exactly a state that has been denied formal recognition may act,
employing Communist China in the 1940s and 50s as a case study. What lengths did China go to
in order to entice states into recognizing them? And when formal recognition was not desired or
the costs of attaining it were too high, what strategies did China employ in order to mitigate the
effects of their non-recognized status? When and where they made efforts to do so, were their
attempts to sidestep their non-recognized status successful?
These are the questions this paper will attempt to answer. There seem to be two distinct
phases to Chinese foreign policy in this era, both of which drive at this question. The period
stretching from 1949 to around 1955 can be broadly characterized by a desire to secure their own
place in the world and establish themselves as a nation, while occasionally unwittingly being
pulled closer to the Soviet Union than the Chinese were comfortable with. China at points in this
time period can be seen as a tumultuous post-revolution regime, still in the metaphorical growing
pains of statehood. During this time China walked a thin tightrope; the Chinese hoped for a
mutually beneficial alliance with the Soviet Union, while hoping to avoid being drawn too close
to the USSR. There was a danger of becoming a Soviet satellite akin to Czechoslovakia, a
situation detrimental to Chinese sovereignty and harmful to its status. The Korean War, I argue,
represents the intersection of a desire for informal recognition of China by the United States, as
well as acute discomfort over the USSR’s intentions towards China.
The second phase was informed by the lessons of the Korean War as well as the armistice
negotiations at Panmunjom and can be characterized as being directed at the realization of
China’s desire for self reliance, to become a state which acts independent of Soviet influence, a
state whose leadership and politics is secure and consolidated. Deprived of formal recognition
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and normative relations with the United States and leery of Soviet ambitions, China sought to
carve out a space for itself in the international sphere at the Geneva Conference of 1954 and
Bandung Conference of 1955. The hoped to use these conferences not as a springboard for grand
ambitions in Taiwan, but rather as an opportunity to enhance mutual relations with states such as
France and Japan, and in doing so enhance their status and prestige. This passage will
investigate the first phase of Chinese foreign policy and diplomacy.

!6
Revolutionary Beginnings, Initial Stage of Sino-Soviet Relations

It seems prudent to begin with the Chinese Civil War, as the formative years of the
Chinese Communist Party inform its actions later on in the metaphorical life of the Chinese state.
Communism in China began as a series of what can be termed land revolutions mostly in
Southern China during the 1920s and 30s.9 The Communist rebels were pitted first against
Chiang-Kai Shek’s nationalist forces in a bloody civil war, and later, beginning in 1936, the
invading Japanese military. It is important to note that Chiang’s Nationalist government was
recognized by the League of Nations and received the tacit approval of the United States. By
coming into conflict with the Nationalists, the Communist Chinese were casting themselves as
hostile to the interests of the United States. This was the first inkling of the enmity which
characterized US-Chinese relations for so many years after the revolution.
Following the Japanese invasion, Chiang and Mao’s forces were able to put their civil
war on hold to some degree, creating a anti-Japanese “united front.”10 War with Japan was costly
both for Mao Zedongs Red Army as well as Chiang’s forces, but Chiang appeared to have gained
more political clout and military power during the eight year war with Japan than his Communist
counterparts. By 1942 and 1943, America and Britain had recognized Chiang Kai-Shek’s China
as part of the “Big Four” states and counted Chiang nominally as an ally. But his input was not

Patrick Fuliang Shan, Local Revolution, Grassroots Mobilization and Wartime Power Shift to the Rise of Communism
(Lexington and Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 8.
9

10Jian,

Chen, Mao's China and the Cold War, (University of North Carolina Press, 2001. http://www.jstor.org/stable/
10.5149/9780807898901_chen.), 20.
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particularly valued, and no one had any illusions that China was a power on par with Russia or
the United States, his inclusion in the Big Four was symbolic at best.
After Japan’s surrender and withdrawal from China in 1945, hostilities between the
Nationalists and Communists almost immediately resumed.11 The United States supported
Chiang’s government to the tune of 3 billion dollars in military financial aid.12 Knowing that
their Nationalist adversary would have the support of a superpower, the Communist forces
sought out a great power backer of their own. The logical partner was the Soviet Union.
Cooperation between the Soviets and Chinese Communists was uneasy. In the lead up to
the outbreak of Civil War Mao believed that “the Soviet Union would not allow the emergence of
an American- backed fascist China in the East after the end of the war.”13 As such, Mao was
initially confident of indirect support from the Soviet Union via financial assistance and weapon
shipments. He was so convinced of Soviet aid that he joked with CCP leaders that if assistance
was not forthcoming that “I will let you have my head.”14 Furthermore, Mao was certain that
Stalin “would not sign a treaty with the GMD government that would restrict the development of
the Chinese revolution.”15 Without informing the Chinese Communists, Stalin had made
promises to President Roosevelt at the 1945 Yalta conference that the USSR would not support

11Shan,

Local Revolution, Grassroots Mobilization and Wartime Power Shift to the Rise of Communism, 10.

12Jian,

Mao's China and the Cold War, 25.

13Jian,

Mao's China and the Cold War, 25.

14Jian,

Mao's China and the Cold War, 24.

15Shen,

Zhihua, and Danhui Li. After Leaning to One Side: China and Its Allies in the Cold War, (Stanford University Press,
2011, p. 360, www.sup.org/books/title/?id=18681.), 25.
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the CCP in the Civil War.16 Obviously, Stalin’s promises were not worth too much; in China and
outside, Stalin’s promises were not taken to be binding. But to blatantly disregard his own
promises would necessitate some loss of face, and so Stalin was constricted into acting less
openly in China than the CCP would have liked. Stalin would not outwardly support the CCP in
the civil war.
The USSR was also keenly interested in reclaiming vital strategic territory that had been
lost by Czarist Russia during the Russo Japanese war before the formation of the Soviet Union in
1905. These territories were primarily the Chinese Changchun Railroad and the port of Lushun
in the Dalian district of Northern China.17 The Changchun Railroad and Lushun were essential
to Soviet power projection in East Asia— the railroad and port formed an unbroken
transportation chain stretching from Moscow to the Yellow Sea. Chiang Kai-Shek’s nationalists
were willing to grant Stalin these territories in exchange for a refusal to openly support the
CCP’s war efforts.18 The Soviets now had a foot in both camps; a victory for either the
Nationalists or Communists would come with benefits for the USSR.
The CCP was perturbed by the actions of the USSR, and were forced to reorient their
thinking towards a Civil War fought without the assistance full assistance of the USSR. Mao
sold this publicly as a “betrayal” rather than a carefully considered strategy. He told party
leaders following Stalin’s support of Chiang that-

16

Zhihua, and Li. After leaning to one side: China and its allies in the Cold War.. 24.

17Zhihua

and Xia. Mao and the Sino–Soviet Partnership, 1945–1959: A New History, 25.

18Zhihua

and Xia. Mao and the Sino–Soviet Partnership, 1945–1959: A New History, 33.
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Confined by the need to maintain international peace, the Soviet Union is not in a
position to act freely to support us ... because if the Soviet Union were to assist us,
the United States would certainly support Jiang, and, as a result, the cause of
international peace would suffer and a world war might follow.19
The Chinese Communists would eventually go on to win the Chinese Civil War; the
details of their victory are not particularly relevant to an analysis of Chinese foreign policy. The
Chinese Communists had at various points in the war received some limited assistance from the
USSR in defiance of the Yalta agreement and Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship. It might be more
accurate to say that at times, the Soviets chose to hinder the nationalist forces in their attempts to
reclaim Manchuria with the intention of indirectly aiding the Communist’s cause.20 However,
the CCP’s distrust of the Soviets stemming from their refusal to fully commit to support of
Chinese Communist cause could not be ameliorated easily.
I mention the earliest days of Chinese Communism in brief to also drive home the point
that Chinese Communist leaders were not accustomed to conducting international diplomacy.
The CCP in its formative period was headed mostly by men of military backgrounds; victorious
generals and other officials.

Lushun and Changchun

19

Minutes, Mao Zedong’s speech to the CCP politburo meeting, 23 August 1945, 30–32.

20Jian,

Chen. Mao's China and the Cold War. 44.
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This next episode in Chinese political history is essential in establishing the nature of
Chinese diplomacy. Up until 1949 , the Communist Chinese had been fairly passive actors in
terms of international diplomacy, which makes sense as they were at the time a revolutionary
movement rather than an established state. Their first encounter with their Japanese neighbors
was not diplomatic, but militaristic in nature. Their dealings with the USSR were limited, and
generally unsuccessful. They had made a few overtures to the Soviet Union for assistance during
the Chinese Civil War, but not formally or forcefully enough to truly constitute an effort at
international diplomacy. This episode is perhaps the first instance where Communist China
engaged with serious diplomatic efforts internationally.
The issue of the Chinese Changchun Railroad and port of Lushun were once again at the
fore in Chinese-USSR relations in 1949. Informal meetings between Soviet and Chinese
officials following the end of the Chinese Civil War revealed that the USSR was intent on the
1945 railroad agreement to be honored by Mao’s China. Mao obviously hoped for a different
outcome; the railroad and port would eventually become important for Chinese
industrialization.21 Changchun and Lushun were the focus of negotiations, a formal alliance was
also being discussed between the two Communist nations. An alliance was agreeable to Mao,
but he was aware of the danger of being drawn too close to the Soviet Union. He did not wish
China to become a Soviet satellite, and was leery of an alliance which would disadvantage the
Chinese and place them on the track towards satellite-dom. Chinese leadership stressed the

21

Zhihua and Xia. Mao and the Sino–Soviet Partnership, 1945–1959: A New History,(Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books), 7.

22Zhihua,

and Li. After leaning to one side: China and its allies in the Cold War. 7.
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importance of self reliance.22 Now that may seem like a painfully obvious statement, to say that
China was hoping for a beneficial partnership with the USSR on its own terms.
What makes this strategy noteworthy is the ambition and guile to ask favors and
concessions of the Soviets; Mao’s China was not ostensibly in a strong enough bargaining
position to be negotiating on an equal playing field with the Soviet Union in 1949. They had just
emerged (not unscathed) from a civil war. In fighting the Nationalists, they had alienated the
United States. Their nation was in need of reconstruction and industrialization, but few
prospective partners could be found. At the time negotiations over Lushun and Changchun
started, joining the Soviet camp was just about the only option available to Communist China
other than going it alone. The Soviet Union had somewhat legitimate claims to Lushun and
Changchun; Mao’s China seemed to have strong enough incentives to seek an alliance with the
USSR that giving up the railroad and port might have been viable if a Soviet alliance was
dependent on those two concessions. It is a testament to the shrewd analysis and skillful
negotiating of Chinese leaders that they were able to leverage Soviets concerns in order to coax
key concessions from the USSR.
Before negotiations began in earnest, Mao deliberately revealed to the Soviet embassy in
China that the CCP was holding negotiations with Burma, India, and Great Britain over the
establishment of normative diplomatic relations with the CCP.23 The intent being to place stress
that a treaty with Stalin might not be the only option available to the Chinese, and to pressure
Stalin to negotiate a treaty with Mao before rapprochement with the United States became viable

23Zhihua,

and Li. After leaning to one side: China and its allies in the Cold War. 7.
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to Chinese leadership. Stalin was evidently disturbed by this development, fearing SinoAmerican rapprochement, which necessitated a softening of the Soviet negotiating stance. With
rapprochement firmly in the realm of possibilities for the Chinese, negotiating an alliance with
the USSR was not so gravely necessary as before. By introducing and stressing the feasibility of
an alternative to a Soviet alliance, the Chinese had strengthened their negotiating position
without any change in the material balance of power. China had reshaped the complexion of the
negotiations so that continued Soviet control of Changchun and Lushun would be an intolerable
loss for the CCP, something the Soviet Union would have to avoid in order to secure an alliance.
It would be untoward for the Soviet Union to further alienate their prospective allies. The second
round of negotiations accomplished little— mostly changes in wording to the title of the
agreement which the two states were to make— and did not advance any meaningful solutions to
the question of the ownership of Changchun and Lushun.24
At the third round of negotiations, the Chinese delegation led by prominent Chinese
leader Zhou Enlai sprung a surprise on the Soviets; rather than renegotiating ownership of the
railroad and port to a shared ownership structure as the Soviets had expected, the Chinese
demanded the USSR turn over full ownership of Lushun and Changchun within three years.25
The Chinese also made Soviet concessions on Changchun and Lushun essential by tying those
concessions to the possibility of an alliance with the USSR; Zhou made it known that no alliance
would be possible without Chinese control of Changchun and Lushun. Alliance with China was
a priority for the Soviets for reasons that will be discussed later. The CCP delegation made clear
24Zhihua

and Xia. Mao and the Sino–Soviet Partnership, 1945–1959: A New History, 55.

25Zhihua

and Xia. Mao and the Sino–Soviet Partnership, 1945–1959: A New History, 59.
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to the Soviets that Changchun and Lushun were non negotiable, and an alliance between the two
nations would only be possible if the two strategic interests were given up by the USSR.
By now, the threat of Sino-American rapprochement had faded to some extent due to the
prospect of war in Korea, but still there was pressure on the USSR to push through an alliance
with China. In January of 1949, it was abundantly clear to both Mao and Stalin that war on the
Korean peninsula was approaching fast. An alliance with China was an obvious desire for the
Soviet Union. Though some small modifications to the demand of full control over the railroad
and port were made by the Soviets, Stalin evidently felt pressured enough by the need for
China’s involvement in Korea to make concessions. The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship,
Alliance and Mutual Assistance was signed Febuary 14 1950, guaranteeing Chinese control of
Changchun and Lushun by 1953, as well as a military alliance between the USSR and China.
This was the first concrete step towards abolishing past treaties with foreign powers that had
placed China at a disadvantage. It could be said that regaining Lushun and Changchun was a one
step toward the Chinese ambition of self reliance, while the alliance with the USSR was a step
backwards.

The Road to War in Korea

Korea in 1950 was a land divided. As it is today, Korea was split along the 38th parallel
with Kim Il Sung’s Soviet backed Communist forces controlling the north and Syngman Rhee’s
US backed regime in the south. Both sides sought to reunify the Korean peninsula through
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armed force, and border skirmishes along the 38th parallel were frequent in the lead up to the
outbreak of the war. Both Chinese and Soviet leadership shared the opinion that open war with
the south was to be avoided, advocating instead for a policy of sustained guerrilla warfare.26
Mao especially had reservations about the strength of the North’s fighting force, although it is
unclear if these were genuine concerns or attempts to sow doubt in the minds of USSr leadership
in order to forestalling the outbreak of war. Either way, both the CCP and Soviets sought to
impress upon Kim that his forces were not equipped to capture the south in the expedient manner
that Kim predicted, and that attacking South Korea openly might lead to a prolonged war against
both the South Koreans and United States. Stalin, however, was less concerned than his
newfound Chinese allies by the prospect of US involvement.
The unity of the Chinese and Russians eroded over time; Stalin authorized North Korea
to attack the South in April of 1950 without consulting China.27 Stalin and other Soviet leaders
neglected to divulge information about planning or the probability of war to Chinese officials,
depriving CCP leadership of any chance to voice concerns about the attack on South Korea.
Chinese scholar Shen Zhihua theorizes that intentionally depriving China of any information
about North Koreas war planning was aimed at making “Beijing a blind accomplice in the
making of a war which, once started, the CCP leadership had to commit itself.”28 He argues that
this was not accidental or owing to oversight.

26Zhihua

and Li. After leaning to one side: China and its allies in the Cold War, 17.

27Zhihua

and Li. After leaning to one side: China and its allies in the Cold War,47.

28

Zhihua and Li. After leaning to one side: China and its allies in the Cold War, 47.
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This is not a line of thinking that I was receptive to at first. It seemed to me a revisionist
attempt to paint China as unwitting accomplice in the Korean War, to shift any blame for their
participation onto Stalin engineered geopolitical machinations. The fact that negotiations on the
Sino-Soviet alliance took place against the backdrop of the rumblings of the Korean War
delegitimize this analysis to some degree. It is hard to say that China was forced against their
wishes into the Korean War when they were quite aware of what an alliance with the USSR
would necessitate in Korea. Zhihua also posits that Stalin’s reasoning for supporting the war in
Korea was to preserved the possibility of Soviet naval power projection in East Asia, which
seems a petty justification.
Having added to this analysis with the works of Richard Thornton, I find it more
acceptable. Thornton agrees with Zhihua that the USSR purposefully involved China in the
Korean war, but not to act as a proxy to support Soviet ambitions vis a vis power projection.
Rather, that the USSR’s reasoning for drawing China into the Korean War was to drive a wedge
between the CCP and the United States, to make rapprochement impossible, leaving reliance on
the Soviet Union as China’s only option in the international sphere.29 The ultimate goal being
the reshaping of Communist China into a Soviet satellite state much like Poland or
Czechoslovakia.30 Stalin suspected that there was "an emerging tacit understanding between
Beijing and Washington on the 'liberation' of Taiwan in exchange for the normalization of SinoAmerican relations.”31 Furthermore, Thornton argues that rather than deepening hostilities
29Thornton,

2001) 82.

Richard C. Odd Man Out: Truman, Stalin, Mao, and the Origins of the Korean War (Washington, D.C: Brasseys,

30Thornton

C Odd Man Out, 81.

31Thornton

C Odd Man Out, 86.
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between the two nations, a “Chinese conquest of Taiwan before the outbreak of war in Korea
would indeed open the door to the establishment of diplomatic relations between Beijing and
Washington.”32 The Soviet’s efforts to rope China into the Korean War before Taiwan could be
taken by Communist China can then be understood as an effort to draw China into the Soviet
camp, make them a proxy for Russian ambitions. It is possible, but it might also be the case that
the Chinese were not intentionally excluded from wartime planning, but rather chose not to take
part in it. They did not enter the war immediately, so it is possible that they felt no responsibility
to involve themselves in North Korea’s preparations, and left that in the hands of the Soviet
Union. Its hard to tell, and I don’t feel I have the authority to adjudicate here.
China paid little attention to the war at its outbreak. The United States had not yet
entered the war, and China’s leadership was preoccupied: the country was in the process of
shrinking its vast army and in the early stages of planning for an attack on Taiwan.33 The entry
of the United States into the war changed Chinas outlook on Korea; as soon as MacArthur’s
troops landed at Inchon, Beijing began to draft plans to assist Kim’s forces.34 China’s fear of a
US controlled Korea seemed a distinct possibility, and Koreas historical role as a springboard for
military actions against the Asian continent was evidently not lost on Mao. “If the US
imperialists win, they will be complacent and pose a threat for us… If the American imperialists
push North Korea down, it will be no good for peace.”35 Mao was convinced that confrontation

32Thornton
33Zhihua

C Odd Man Out, 89.

and Li. After leaning to one side: China and its allies in the Cold War, 34.

34Halberstam,
35
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with the United States was inevitable, and decided it was best to fight the United States in Korea
rather than in China’s own land.36
The decision to enter the Korean War was not directly born out of ideological fervor or
some fraternal desire to aid a Communist neighbor, but rather border insecurity., perhaps
enhanced by the presence of a recognized “China” (Taiwan) whose cause could be taken up by
the United States. Its an unlikely scenario, but international relations scholarship does note that
un-recognized states are susceptible to having their sovereignty and territory violated by
recognized ones. It must be said that China is perhaps exceptional among un-recognized states
in terms of size and military capability, reducing the likelihood of an American invasion. Still,
and this is speculative, it is possible that the unrecognized status of Communist China heightened
their border anxieties at the outset of American involvement in Korea.
China responded accordingly on July of 1950, 260,000 Red Army troops massed at the
northern border of Korea.37 They would not wait long before seeing combat— China crossed the
border into Korea on October 19 1950, and its 260,000 soldiers quickly entered the fray.38 And
thus China was forced to enter war against South Korea and the United States when given its
domestic concerns and hope for conquest of Taiwan it would certainly have preferred not to.
This era of Chinese foreign policy must be considered as a failure, although not a
complete one. China’s aim was to regain territory lost in what it felt was an unfair bargain and
regain some degree of sovereignty in doing so. However, the gains made in the 1949 and 1950
36
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37Barnouin,
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negotiations came at a cost; war in Korea forced China to cancel its plans to attack Taiwan at a
time when the United States seemed uncommitted to the protection of Chiang Kai-Shek’s
regime.39 So while China set out in 1949 to become self reliant, this goal was thwarted to some
extent by Soviet geopolitical scheming, which made rapprochement with the United States and
the legitimation that would come with it nearly impossible. The Korean War would slam shut
the door to recognition by the United States, and cement China’s position as Soviet ally.

39Zhihua
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Panmunjom and the Decision to End the War

After some push and pull on the Korean peninsula, the war eventually seemed to be
reaching a stalemate around the spring of 1951. The goal of reunification of Korea appeared
increasingly unlikely for both North and South and as with before the war’s outset, the country
was split down the middle very close to the original border. Fighting proved inconclusive, and
so the United States, China and both Koreas were willing to begin negotiations with the goal of
ending the war or at least coming to agreement on a temporary armistice. But Chinese and
American leadership held differing notions on the specific purpose of the armistice. This section
will examine the relative positions and attitudes of Chinese and American leadership just before
and during the early phases of the armistice negotiations.
The United States viewed the negotiations through the lens of military power; the
armistice was a military solution to a military problem that should not ostensibly advance
political goals. The armistice, as they understood it, would put legal backing to the military
situation in Korea, and essentially reinforce the stalemate. The United States often criticized the
Chinese negotiators for attempting to include what the US negotiators deemed political issues on
the agenda.40 The Korean War was in their eyes a distraction from Soviet actions in Western
Europe, and the armistice was a method of refocusing their attention on their true political goals.
So while the US did have political goals to achieve, armistice was a step towards focusing on
their political goals, rather than the realization of those goals. Following the decision to seek an
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armistice, the United States became unwilling to commit troops to any sort of major offensive.41
The United States seemed to believe in the possibility of an armistice and were convinced that
the Chinese would have no issue with an armistice that was militarily focused. In this context, it
became difficult if not impossible for US Generals and policymakers to justify the loss of life
that would come with a large push towards a total victory or the reunification of Korea. So any
change in the status quo which would necessitate great loss of life was out of the question. The
United States was also feeling the strain of maintaining the status quo; they faced pressure both
domestically and from their allies to end the war. The Korean War diverted the focus of the US
military and State Department away from Europe, where they preferred to focus most of their
political capital or energy. This is an almost patronizing view that does in some way recognize
China as a threat but not the true threat, a distraction from the US’s ultimate goals. One of
China’s goals at the negotiating table was centered around not on moving towards formal
recognition but rather increasing its status or prestige by partaking in a peace conference with the
United States. But it is clear that the American view of the Korean War and the armistice as a
distraction does not indicate much respect for China as an actor.
The Chinese saw an armistice as useful only if it was politically oriented and advanced
their foreign policy goals. For the CCP, an armistice was a step towards the realization of
political goals, but was also a goal in itself. The Chinese as a newly formed and still contested
nation would prefer not to be at war with a superpower so close to their borders while their
nation was still recovering from a civil war. CCP leadership also saw the Korean war not as an
isolated incident, but rather the culmination of long standing American enmity and
41
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condescension towards China.42 The analysis of Chinese leadership was that US had behaved as
an imperialist power in China since the 19th century. Recently the United States had refused to
aid Communist forces in World War Two, and supported Chiang Kai-Shek. As such, the Korean
War armistice presented an opportunity for China to for the first time force the United States to
negotiate with it as a somewhat equal stakeholder in international politics. Forcing the United
States to come to the negotiating table was in itself a victory for Chinese status. China’s status
would be enhanced as a result of both an increase in military prestige (facing down the United
States army is a rare feat that garners respect) but also because being a principle principle actor
negotiating with the United States is status enhancing. It was a chance to announce to the world
that they were a player worthy of respect in the international sphere, one who could withstand
the assault of the greatest military force in the world and force it to make concessions when
negotiating for peace. For the Chinese, there was more at stake than a swift end to the war.
The Chinese also felt they were more equipped and willing than their American
counterparts to face a protracted war in Korea.43 Though attuned to the possibility of great loss
of life, Chinese leadership felt its aims were important enough to justify the cost to its troops.
This speaks to a wide gulf in objectives between the Chinese and US negotiators that proved
difficult to overcome. The United States’s goals at the negotiations were focused squarely on
short term objectives, namely extricating themselves from the Korean War. China was less
concerned with a swift end to the war than it was with enhancing its status motivated more by a
desire to right historical wrongs. At this point, the Chinese were not quite aware of the benefits
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of enhancing its status, and did not see it as an end goal. It was more a good to be gained as the
byproduct of righting what they saw as historical wrongs. Late, at the Geneva and Bandung
Conferences, CCP leadership began to see status enhancement as inherently beneficial to the
smooth operation of the state in the international sphere. But at this stage in Chinese history,
there is nothing to suggest that the Chinese hoped to gain status for any specific purpose.

Armistice Talks Begin — Kaesong

The first inklings of concrete negotiation came in January 1951, when Zhou Enlai was
presented with a United Nations proposal for a cease-fire agreement. Zhou turned down the
proposal without much hesitation: the proposal came at the height of the PLA’s victories in
Korea. Enlai also rejected the overtures of the UN, saying that it was an initiative whose purpose
was “merely to give the United States troops a breathing space.”44 This was not the last time that
a prominent Chinese leader or even Zhou himself would level such accusations at the United
Nations. Zhou stated that China would not accept a cease-fire with the promise of negotiations
later. In any case, Zhou proclaimed that any sort of agreement between the United States and
China would have to be comprehensive and final. He also boldly declared that China’s demands
for an armistice in Korea would necessitate the withdrawal of US forces from Taiwan, and UN
membership for PRC China.45 It is unclear if these demands were genuinely expected to be met
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by the United States (unlikely), but to even articulate them as necessary to an armistice
reinforces the notion that China’s aims in ending the Korean War were tied to international
recognition or legitimation. Perhaps it could be said that this was the upper limit of Chinese
ambitions at the height of their success in Korea, and that as the war dragged on what they
believed to be achievable was reshaped by results on the battlefield.
When negotiations at Kaesong began on June 10 1951, the Chinese firmly believed that
the United States was willing to meet Chinese demands, and treat China as a equal actor.46 They
interpreted reports from India on UN attitudes as well as several remarks by Secretary of State
Dean Acheson as being indicative of American war weariness and pressure from allies to end the
war. The Chinese believed that as long as the United States was earnest and cooperative, all that
would be necessary was a “limited amount of negotiations to finalize the armistice agreement.”47
Preliminary talks were held at Kaesong. The attitudes of Chinese negotiators at the first
meeting of representatives at Kaesong towards their American counterparts support this notion.
They welcomed the American negotiating team cordially, inviting the American group to partake
with the Chinese in an informal discussion about the armistice over tea and cigarettes, in line
with traditional Chinese negotiating practices.48 The Americans representatives refused, not
wanting to appear to be fraternizing with their enemy, but also confused by the relaxed and
cordial attitude of the Chinese. They were in Kaesong for business, not tea. Unperturbed, the
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Chinese offered the Americans a prepared lunch, and were again turned down.49 It is at this point
that the Chinese became worried by the uncompromising attitudes of the American negotiators.
The Chinese offer of tea and lunch is not to suggest that they believed the negotiations to be such
a mere formality that they might be concluded via an informal chat. Instead, it implies that the
Chinese believed that the Americans came prepared to deal with China as an equal power, and so
wanted to treat the American envoy with some dignity and cordiality, in line with Chinese
procedure when negotiating.
Instead, the Americans were hostile to any offer of hospitality, and some members of the
American negotiating team are even said by Alfred D. Wilhelm to have “mocked” the amenities
the Chinese offered.50 Clearly, Chinese assumptions about the willingness of the United States to
act respectfully toward China were off the mark.
The Chinese opened formal negotiations by proposing a five point agenda that they
declared must be adhered to for any meaningful negotiations to take place.
1. Adoption of agenda. 2. Fixing a military demarcation line between both sides
so as to establish a demilitarized zone as a basic condition for cessation of
hostilities in Korea. 3. Concrete arrangements for realization of a ceasefire and
armistice in Korea, including composition, authority and functions of a
supervisory organization for carrying out the terms of a truce and armistice. 4.
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Arrangements relating to prisoners of war. 5. Recommendations to the
governments of the countries concerned on both sides.51
Sources differ on the setting of the agenda. Alfred d. Wilhelm, a career military officer
present at negotiations, writes that the American contingent was displeased by the manner in
which the Chinese were able to establish the agenda to include only items that they felt the
Americans would or should cave in to.52 By setting the goalposts in a manner which benefited
China, the United States was able only to negotiate towards the implantation of those items that
were established by the agenda, rather than the content of the agenda itself. However, Matthew
Ridgway—Commander in Chief of the UN contingent— wrote in a report to the joint chief of
staffs that the UN team merely suggested minor changes in wording of agenda items, and that the
items to be placed on the agenda were acceptable.53 In any event, the agenda was set.
The return of Taiwan to the PRC was notably absent from the agenda. Despite Zhou
Enlai’s earlier bullishness, China lacked the leverage to force concessions on Taiwan or CCP UN
membership. After the agenda was set, negotiations were able to proceed within the established
framework.

Implementation of Agenda Items— Panmunjong

Commander in Chief, United Nations Command ( Ridgway ) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Korea , 18 July 1951—8:40 p. m.
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Negotiations following the setting of an agenda were moved to the more neutral locations
of Panmunjong. Part of the difficulty of discussing these negotiations stems from the long period
that it took to work out an agreement. This portion may at times be lacking preciseness in
timing. The first item to be settled was the establishment of a demilitarized zone, part of agenda
item two. The Americans opened proceedings in August of 1951 with an offer that shocked and
insulted the Chinese negotiators. The Americans proposed that the DMZ be established at the
point of contact between the two forces and extend north a staggering 20 miles into Communist
controlled territory, with US and South Korean territory being unaffected.54 In essence, North
Korea would lose 20 miles of territory while South Korea would remain unchanged. The
Chinese felt the offer was degrading and unequal to an extreme. The Americans seemed to have
little justification for this offer; it was the opinion of the Chinese that the point of contact was a
reflection of the efforts and power of both sides, and so the DMZ should extend equally into
North and South.55 They took the fairly reasonable position that each nation should lose an equal
amount of territory to the demilitarized zone, rather than just North Korea.
Negotiations dragged on, but the Chinese were eventually able to force the United States
to concede to a DMZ along the point of contact extending four miles north and south, as the
Chinese had hoped for.56 It is unclear what exactly the Americans were trying to accomplish in
proposing such an unequal opening offer. Their offer served only to inflame tensions with their
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Chinese counterparts, which while not a hardship for the US, was certainly not ideal.
Nevertheless, the negotiated demarcation line would hold for the next two years as negotiations
on the rest of the agenda items took place.

Deadlock Intensifies

The Chinese did not expect a difficult resolution to the issue of the repatriation of
prisoners of war. They believed the United States would return Chinese and North Korean
POWs without much of a fuss. After all, the United States had authored Article 118 of the
Geneva Convention which dictates that “Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated
without delay after the cessation of hostilities.”57 The Chinese were aware of the possibility that
their troops, who were ostensibly classified as volunteers, might not fall under the the
jurisdiction of Article 118 in the strictest sense. Or that at least the Chinese were aware that the
United States might make such an argument.58 Still, the prevailing opinion amongst Chinese
leadership at the time was that the United States would honor the international law which it had
written.
The Americans once again caught the Chinese by surprise with their stance. America
refused to repatriate a large portion of the Chinese and North Korean POWs they held owing to
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the fact that the POWs apparently did not wish to be repatriated.59 This position is a bold
reversal of the United States’s stance given their authorship of the Geneva Convention. The
Chinese negotiators were also understandably disturbed to hear that their own troops apparently
did not wish to return home. To meet this demand of the Americans was unthinkable. It would
necessitate a monumental loss of face and was disturbingly unequal; real progress had been made
towards an agreement on other agenda items, and for the US to propose such a plainly unequal
arrangement after the earlier successes had an unnerving affect on CCP leadership.60
Mao felt the possibility of an agreement within the context of this unequal position was
impossible. He refused even to entertain the idea, and instructed Li Kenong, chief negotiator at
Panmunjong, that “you should be prepared to maneuver with the enemy for a few more months,”
as a result.61 And the Americans were at that time unwilling to budge from their stance. There
was not unanimous agreement amongst the leadership of the Communist nations on how to
proceed; Mao was steadfast on not giving in to the Americans, while Kim was openly supportive
of conceding to American demands. Kim was unwilling to continue the war on account of the
losses his army had suffered as well as the toll that an indiscriminate US bombing campaign had
taken on his civilian population.62 Kim, in Zhou Enlai’s words, “believes that the continuation of
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the war is not advantageous because the daily losses are greater than the number of POWs whose
return is being discussed.”63
Fearing that the Americans might make use of the POW issue in order to drive a wedge
between Korean and Chinese leaders, Mao reached out to Stalin for backing. Zhou Enlai headed
to Moscow to meet with the Soviet leader, and returned successful. Stalin said to Zhou of the
POW issue that “Mao Zedong is right. This war is getting on America’s nerves… Endurance
and patience is needed here.”64 This willingness to prolong war is once again based on the
assumption that China and North Korea were more equipped and willing to handle a protracted
war, and that the United States would in time concede the POW issue owing to pressures both
domestic and foreign. Stalin and Zhou both felt that the United States’s unwillingness to commit
too any ground forces, instead opting for bombing campaigns, was a sign of fatigue.65 But the
Americans showed no willingness to do so, and on October 8 1952 suspended the talks at
Panmunjong.66
The death of Stalin in March of 1953 changed the complexion of the negotiations.
Stalins successors were far less willing to continue support for the War, instead choosing to focus
on domestic concerns.67 Molotov articulated the Soviet stance that “events have evolved to such
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a point that we no longer need this war forced upon us by the Koreans.”68 It is interesting to note
that he did not assign blame for the continuation of the war on the Chinese. Without the support
of the Soviet Union, Mao was outnumbered in the Communist camp. China was forced to return
to the negotiating table in June of 1953. Eventually, both sides met one another in the middle.
China and the United States agreed that only those troops who refused repatriation would not be
returned to their respective nations. All other POWs would be repatriated.
The negotiations were not a complete success for China. Around 22,000 Chinese and
North Korean troops refused repatriation. Still, this is a large departure from the original
American position, and so can be considered a small victory. Both sides walked away form
Panmunjong with reason to be pleased. The Chinese had proved to the international community
that they were a powerful actor that could not be ignored or pushed around by even the United
States. This could be called a victory as far as China’s status is concerned; they were able to face
down the most powerful military in the world and negotiate skillfully and advantageously for
peace. This was a victory that the CCP was keenly aware of and was noted throughout the world
and by General Mark W. Clark of the United States. “I gained the unenviable distinction of
being the first United States commander in history to sign an armistice without victory.”69
Meanwhile, the US was able to retain control of Taiwan and did not have to commit to any
actions which might grant China formal recognition. China was also not granted UN
membership, one of their original stipulations.
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Initially China’s aims at Panmunjong to have been ordered around righting historical
wrongs continuing along a theme of correcting disadvantageous treaties which began at the
negotiations over Lushun and Changchun. But the status and prestige gained by negotiating with
the United States at Panmunjong alerted Chinese leadership to the possible uses of international
conferences as a vehicle for status enhancement, which Zhou Enlai would later employ as a
deliberate strategy. Panmunjong paved the way for increasing Chinese involvement in foreign
affairs such as the Geneva Convention of 1954 and Bandung. seem They were now a player in
Asian politics, a nation to be respected.

!32
Geneva Conference of 1954

The shape of this passage will mirror closely the preceding passage on the negotiations at
Panmunjong. I will however be examining the attitudes and positions of a larger group of actors
than those who were involved at Panmunjong, before moving on the the negotiations themselves.
Unlike Panmunjong, the buildup to the Conference is in many ways more relevant to this paper
than the Conference itself. As such this “introductory” passage which might in other
circumstances be viewed as an appetizer to the entree takes on great significance.
The Geneva Conference of 1954 included a much wider range of issues and actors than
Panmunjong, and as such a discussion of France, the United Kingdom, and Vietnam seems
necessary. Although unresolved issues related to the Korean War were on the agenda, they were
regarded as a peripheral issue (unlikely to be resolved besides that) and the chief focus of the
conference was elsewhere. It is against the backdrop of the First Indochinese War that the
Geneva Conference took place. Chinese backed Communist Vietminh rebels pitted themselves
against the apparently hapless French colonial armies in Vietnam in an attempt to free Vietnam
from French colonial rule. China sought to prop up the Vietminh in the hopes of gaining a
Communist neighbor; the United States had to at least appear to be helpful towards an ally, but
more likely was concerned about Communization of the developing decolonization movement.
It seems prudent to begin with the United States, whose decision it was to organize the
Geneva Conference. The decision to host the Geneva Conference came hot on the heels of the
Berlin Conference. It decided little and for our purposes mostly served to make clear that a
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conference to settle issues related to Indochina was necessary. At Berlin, the USSR fought hard
to have China involved in this proposed conference, as they and others felt China’s participation
was vital both in resolving Indochinese questions and enhancing China’s status.
Elected officials in the United States were apprehensive about China’s involvement.
Senate Majority leader William Knowland who headed what was known as the China Lobby—
US elected officials sympathetic towards Taiwan and openly hostile towards PRC China—
questioned Secretary of State John Foster Dulles decision to invite China to participate in the
first place.70 The influential China Lobby felt that by giving China a seat at the negotiating table,
that China’s aims were being legitimized and its status enhanced. Furthermore, Congress in
general made it known quite publicly to Dulles that any action which would move towards
diplomatic recognition of China should be off the table.71 Dulles agreed, but that topic was
something of a nonstarter. Due to conditions upon agreed by Vyacheslav Molotov, Foreign
Minister of the Soviet Union at Berlin, issues of China’s recognition, Taiwan, and UN
membership were officially not meant to be discussed at the conference.72 Dulles stated that
“neither the invitation to, nor the holding of, the above-mentioned conference shall be deemed to
imply diplomatic recognition in any case where it has not already been accorded.”73 Or at least
they were officially not to be part of the agenda for the conference.
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Dulles was also attuned to the idea that by securing a seat for themselves at a “great
power” conference, China’s status and prestige would be enhanced. This would not be ideal for
the United States. He publicly voiced strong condemnation of this line of thinking, futilely
arguing against the notion that China was a great power or that Geneva would elevate its status.
Status is after all relative, so Dulles made a valiant attempt to forcefully shape other nations
perceptions of China’s involvement, seemingly to no avail. He issued a communiqué to all state
department principle posts urging US representatives to discourage other nations from
employing the term “Five Power Conference” when discussing the Geneva Conference.74 This
language tacitly acknowledges China as existing in a similar status stratum as the other
conference attendees. Dulles urged his colleagues to “take whatever action deemed advisable to
prevent or correct labeling conference ‘Big Five’ or ‘Five Power’ and to encourage use of
‘Geneva Conference.’’75 It seems that Dulles was keenly aware of the conference’s potential as
status enhancer.
The French were losing ground in the fight against the Vietminh, and were hopeful of
American intervention. Unfortunately for them Congress, President Eisenhower, and Dulles
refused to join the conflict outright, not wanting to be drawn into a second Korea, but also
wishing not to appear an imperialist aggressor. The United States was willing to become
involved in Indochina only if a coalition between France, the US and the UK could be created, in
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effect an East Asian NATO.76 This proposed collective security agreement would essentially act
as a bulwark against decolonization, and specifically decolonization aimed at Communization.
For the British and French their interests were in retaining control of their colonies; the United
States was mostly concerned that states emerging from colonial rule might become communized.
By April of 1954, some sort of East Asian collective security agreement seemed possible with the
backing of both France and the United States, and although opinions were divided with the State
Department it seemed the Eisenhower administration was willing to commit if Britain joined the
pact.77 Britain declared herself open to such an arrangement but not before the Geneva
Conference could be held, opting to wait and see if the conference bore fruit before making
concrete commitments.78 Their ownership of Hong Kong added a layer of complexity to their
decision making process in regard to their relationship with China, who they wished not to
antagonize unduly. The United Kingdom and France both acknowledged that China, supplier of
arms and training to the Vietminh, was a necessity at the Geneva Conference. They believed it
vital that the United States and China reach a modus viviendi in the region, but their expectations
about the likelihood of that occurring were pragmatically low.
Singman Rhee, whose South Korean regime was to figure prominently in the Korean
aspect of negotiations, was not optimistic. He felt the conference would be a farce which might
serve to enhance China’s status, and is on the record stating that the Geneva Conference would
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be “further useless talk.”79 Dulles agreed. To assuage Rhee’s concerns, Dulles publicly
promised that the United States would end the conference within three months if it became clear
that the conference bore no fruit, and was being employed by China to serve as a “propaganda
device.”80 This is not to imply that Rhee was a wise statesman; he was a dictator intent on
keeping firm grip on power. Elections in Korea were not in his interests.
So the attitudes of the United States and its allies at the time could be summed up as
such; China must be present at a discussion of the issue of Indochina, which was the topic of
greatest concern for the Western powers. The Korean aspect of negotiations was expected to be
mostly useless: what could not be resolved at Panmunjong was not likely to be resolved just one
year later. The United States was strongly opposed to any action which would grant China
formal legal recognition, and made provisions with the Soviet Union to ensure that issues of
recognition were off the table. Finally, the United States was wary of the strong likelihood that
China might use the conference as a platform to enhance its status, to claim that by being at the
Geneva Conference, they had been tacitly admitted into to the “Great Power” echelon of states.
Keenly aware that status is determined not by material forces but by the perception of states, the
United States sought to shape discourse to minimize China’s role in the conference from Great
Power participant to rogue state under cross examination for untoward actions in Vietnam.

Soviet Union and China
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The USSR was wary of the development of an East Asian NATO, and were justifiably
concerned that Indochina was being prepared as a new Korea.81 They were relieved to find that
Britains qualms had scattered French hopes of building a coalition before the conference took
place, but still could not discount the possibility of American intervention. Through Pravda, the
Soviets made known that they, like France and the UK, felt strongly the impossibility of deciding
“a single disputed question” without China’s involvement.82 The Soviets also saw the
conference as an opportunity to display the unanimity of socialist governments, with the
Vietminh, China, and North Korea all being involved in some capacity. This runs counter to
China’s desire for Geneva to be a step towards great power status. Being considered as another
nation under the wing of the USSR does not enrich a states standing in the hierarchy of
international relations.
Zhou Enlai worried that the United States was preparing to make Vietnam into another
Korea.83 China was publicly opposed to any Western intervention in Vietnam and were prepared
to put India, their newfound ally, to work towards discouraging the United States and Britain
from forming such an organization.84 A very reasonable position indeed: having just negotiated
themselves out of a war with the United States, China had no desire to become involved in yet
another conflict with the West. In practical terms in regards to Vietnam, China hoped to use the
Geneva Conference as a platform to negotiate a favorable peace deal, which would eliminate the
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need for the United States to organize an East Asian collective defense organization.85 They
refused to make any commitment to the Vietminh beyond the arms, munition, and training they
already supplied in the event of failure at Geneva and Western intervention. This suggests that
the Chinese assumed talks at Geneva would be productive, perhaps in spite of the United States.
Mao Zedong will not figure prominently in this chapter. By this time, he had decided to
focus his attention on domestic policy, leaving foreign policy in the capable hands of Zhou Enlai,
long serving Chinese Foreign Policy Minister. Zhou would run the show at Geneva. Zhou, in a
series of documents recently released by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, outlines his
thoughts on the United States and other actors in the lead up to Geneva. These documents range
from somewhat informal telegrams to communiqués distributed throughout CPR leadership.
Despite public bullishness about the prospects of a productive conference, Zhou seems
not to think much of the conference as a platform for achieving concrete goals in Vietnam or
Korea. In one document he points to public statements made by Secretary Dulles which are
aimed at “intentionally underestimating the significance of the Geneva Conference” with the
goal of making it into a pointless exercise, grounds for the United States to claim that diplomatic
solutions were unrealistic and that intervention in Vietnam was necessary.86 Part of the problem
may have been that their stances on Korea and Vietnam were unlikely to be met favorably by the
United States, France, or South Korea. Zhou supported “peaceful unification” and “free
elections” with the goal of reunifying the Korean peninsula.87 The Chinese delegation’s initial
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proposal for peace in Vietnam was quite brazen. The Chinese committed to the cessation of arms
to the Vietminh if the United States did the same with its French allies, which seemed unlikely.88
The Chinese also demanded the withdrawal of French forces from Vietnam within 6 months of
ratification of an armistice agreement.89 They included in their demands provisions for free
elections to be held in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, which implies that they expected all those
countries to be unified. This laundry list of demands was unlikely to be met.
He speaks of China’s involvement and prominent place at the Geneva Convention as a
“great achievement” which had been met with “widespread support by peace loving peoples”
throughout the world.90 While he was not optimistic about the prospects of concrete action in
Korea or Vietnam, Zhou was hopeful that in spite of American foot dragging real ground could
be made in the struggle for status. He lays out a broad course of action for the Chinese
delegation; if the United States and other nations are not able to be made receptive to Chinese
demands, China must actively engage even on small issues rather than become disheartened. He
says that negotiating on these small issues will for China“open the path to resolving international
disputes through discussion and negotiation by the Great Powers.”91 This indicates that Zhou
had more than just status on his mind; the conference presented an opportunity to enhance
mutual relations with other states present in a general sense. Chinese foreign ministers would
have the chance to meet with and hopefully develop a rapport with other foreign officials. But
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more importantly, the simple act of negotiating in Zhou Enlai’s thinking is an act which carries
great symbolic significance and advances China’s status. By being invited to and serving as an
important part of a convention of Great Powers, Enlai saw Chinese involvement at Geneva as a
groundbreaking moment in Chinese history. An admission, despite adamant protests on the Part
of the United States, that China sat at the table of the Great Powers.
In addition to advancing China’s status, Zhou was hopeful for a change in Chinese
American relations. His writings as well as the analysis of others gives no clues as to why he
thought this might be realistic. The presence of phrases which express hope for “relaxing the
tense international situation and embargo by the US imperialists” implies that Zhou hoped the
conference would be an opportunity to develop rapport with American diplomats and work
towards detente.92 These writings were not distributed publicly, so they cannot be considered as
posturing for the Chinese public. As far as I can tell from the assortment of documents I have
read, legal recognition does not seem to have been on Zhou’s mind.

China at the Geneva Conference

Zhou Enlai served as chief representative of the Chinese delegation to the Geneva
Conference— he was the natural choice for such a role. His arrival at the Geneva airport on
April 14 1954 caused something of a media sensation, as he was one of the first high ranking
Chinese leaders to appear on European soil (Soviet bloc nations excluded) since the revolution.
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Oddly enough, much of the “action” at Geneva occurred not in Geneva, but during breaks in the
conference throughout Europe and Asia. China did not play such a prominent role in the
specifics of the Indochina negotiations, leaving that to the Vietminh. Their role in the conference
was mostly relegated to acting as an intermediary between the Vietminh and France when
negotiations stalled. But Chinese diplomats were present at the conference throughout, and
without much negotiating to eat up their time, the Chinese delegation busied themselves by
holding informal talks with British and French officials with the goal of enhancing mutual
relations with an eye towards establishing trade. The United States was openly contemptuous of
the Chinese delegation for the entirety of the conference, so the Chinese were not able to make
nice with the Americans. This was expected.
The Korean aspect of the conference amounted to nothing. Both sides agreed that
elections should take place on the peninsula with an eye towards democratic reunification. But
they could not come to an agreement on the implementation of such an election; each wished for
a different governing body to act as intermediary. The South Korean’s, backed by the United
States, proposed that the UN supervise post war elections.93 This was a proposal that North
Korea and China refused to entertain; Chinese diplomats argued that the United Nations was not
an impartial body, having been utilized by the United States to denounce China and form a
military coalition to attack North Korea.94 China further argued that UN presence in Korea was a
violation of Korean sovereignty; an intrusion of American imperialism into Asia, and further
deemed that only other Asian nations such as India should be allowed supervise a hypothetical
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election.95 Neither side showed any willingness to budge from their initial positions, and both
decided to move onto the Indochinese portion.
During various interludes in negotiations that Chinese delegates found time to meet with
British delegates both informally and formally. Assistants to Zhou Enlai met frequently with the
assistants of British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden during the conference. Both nations were
playing marginal roles at the conference, and thus Zhou instructed his underlings to engage in
relaxed and informal meetings with British officials.96 Despite the informal character of these
meetings, they were productive and produced demonstrable positive change in Sino-British
relations. These discussions bore fruit; China and Britain agreed to conduct diplomacy at the
charge d’affairs level, while previously each nation had not recognized each others foreign
representatives as such.97 This allowed for more productive diplomacy between the nations. In
addition, China and Britain agreed to exchange trade missions with the goal of establishing trade
networks between the two nations.
France and the Vietminh took the lead in the Indochinese portion of the conference. The
specifics of this negotiation will be discussed only insofar as they are relevant to China, which
was an infrequent occurrence. The French and Vietminh both agreed that at the very least, an
armistice marked by a demarkation line was mutually beneficial. The terms of the armistice
were to be worked out after an agreement over the location demarkation line could be completed.
The United States was insistent on the withdrawal of NVA forces from Cambodia and Laos,
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which the Vietminh would have liked to avoid but did not feel was a key issue.98 It is around this
early point in negotiations on June 13th that negotiations reached a deadlock. The United States
would not back an armistice if NVA forces were to remain in Cambodia and Laos; perhaps more
importantly, the NVA were determined to set the demarkation line in their favor. They hoped to
set the demarkation line at the 16th parallel, while the French and South Vietnamese held out for
the 17th parallel a bit farther north. Both sides refused to compromise for ten or so days, when
China entered the fray.
Pierre Mendes-France was elected as French Prime Minister on June 18, 1954. He had
made strong promises on the campaign trail: he told the French people he would resign by July
20th if no resolution was reached at Geneva.99 This certainly won him the election, but
presented the Chinese with an opportunity. Throughout the conference, they had been
establishing cordial relations with French diplomats, and although these informal meetings bore
no fruit, mutual relations between France and China had improved somewhat. Zhou decided this
was the time make himself useful. He scheduled a meeting with Mendes-France and hoped to
exploit the newly minted Prime Minister’s desperation to leave Geneva with a resolution to the
Indochinese War.
Zhou was met cordially by the French in Berne on June 23, and at more meetings in mid
July. Minutes of the meetings indicate the Zhou spoke more often than Mendes-France
throughout. But from what little Mendes-France divulged, Zhou gathered that the French Prime
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Minister wanted to pull out of Vietnam entirely.100 Anti-war sentiment had reached a fever pitch.
But Mendes-France wished for France to leave in his own words “gracefully in appearance.”101
An opening had made itself clear to Zhou. The deadlock in negotiations was unacceptable for
Mendes-France, who needed a swift exit from Vietnam. If Zhou could entice the Vietminh into
accepting the 17th parallel as the demarkation line which would allow France to save face and
bow out with their dignity intact, the French would agree to leave Vietnam and the conference
could be concluded in China and the Vietminh’s favor.
Zhou traveled to Ziuzhou on July 3rd to speak with NVA leaders. He was able to sell the
Vietminh on conceding to the 17th parallel by convincing them that the demarkation line was
only a temporary conceit. He told the NVA that “after French withdrawal, all of Vietnam will be
yours.”102 Whether or not he genuinely believe this to be true is impossible to say, but the NVA
was sold, and agreed both the 17th parallel demarkation line and a withdrawal of its forces from
Cambodia and Laos.103 In addition, neither North nor South Vietnam was to enter into formal
military partnerships (exchange of arms, military advisors) with any nation, and elections were to
be held in July of 1956.104 These elections were to be supervised by Canadian, Indian, and
Polish election monitors.
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China had every reason to be pleased initially with the resolution of the Geneva
Conference; it had successfully negotiated a French withdrawal from Vietnam, which was both a
tactical and propagandistic victory. The French retreat was beneficial tactically in that it
increased the chances of future Vietminh control of Southern Vietnam. Propaganda wise, China
could sell itself as an ally of Asian sovereignty, opponent of imperialism, not an aggressor but a
negotiator. It had also made headway with Great Britain, with which China had established
normative diplomatic and economic relations during an interlude in the conference.
But the agreement to hold an election and the prohibition against forming military pacts
with other nations was very quickly violated by Southern Vietnam in 1956.105 The Southern
Vietnamese quickly moved to accept military aid from the United States (thus discouraging
attack from the NVA) and rejected the resolution to hold a unified election, citing the
impossibility of a fair outcome. So the actual tactical gains made at Geneva ended up not
counting for much in the long run. However, it could be argued that this offered another
propaganda opportunity. The Chinese could cement claims to being the opponent of American
imperialism in Asia, a move which could become status enhancing if played correctly.
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Bandung Conference: Chinese Benevolence in the Emergent Third World
The Bandung Conference was one of the first official meetings of newly formed post
colonial Asian and African states and took place from April 18-24 in Bandung, Indonesia. It was
sponsored and organized by Indonesia, Burma, Pakistan, Ceylon, and India. The aims of the
conference as articulated by the 29 attendees are as follows.

A. To promote good will and co-operation among the nations of Asia and Africa,
to explore and advance their material as well as common interests and to
establish and further friendliness and neighborly relations;
B. To consider social, economic and cultural problems and relations of the
countries represented;
C. To consider problems of special interest to Asian and African peoples, for
example, problems affecting national sovereignty and of racialism and
colonialism;
D. To view the position of Asian and Africa and their people in the world of
today and the contribution they can make to the promotion of world peace and
co-operation.106
Essentially, the freshly decolonized nations of Asian and Africa were anxious about their
place in the world, and wished to form a consensus on how they might proceed in the
international sphere. This is an unscientific statement, but it was a conference of good feelings;
many of the nations present had just thrown off the yoke of colonial rule, and were hopeful for a
future to call their own. In general, as Richard Wright describes in his book The Color Curtain
describes how nearly all conference attendees were in good spirits and generally kept any
grievances against other states to themselves. This was a conference of goodwill— Bandung
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was not a conference narrow focused discussion of set issues like at Geneva; the agenda was
purposefully vague and open ended. Although certain topics such as human rights and state
sovereignty were discussed, they were broached in a manner that was directed at building
consensus between nations, rather than forming a prescriptive set of guidelines to abide by. The
Bandung Conference was not meant to produce concrete agreements between states, but rather
build a consensus on those issues on the agenda mentioned above, and facilitate goodwill.
The ultimate goal of this goodwill, trust, and consensus building was to enhance the
standing of non-western nations and to carve out space in the international sphere for nonaligned nations. Nearly all the 29 attendees of the conference had been colonial states and all of
them had felt the affects of western interference in the affairs. By enhancing relations amongst
one another, the organizers of the conference hoped to create a situation where themselves and
the attending nations might be able to become as independent from western interference as
possible. To truly become non-aligned.
The west was not pleased with this prospective goodwill between post-colonial nations.
France was displeased, generally viewed the conference with open contempt, and saw it as
damaging to some notion of the western cause.107 At this point the French still held colonies in
North Africa such as Algeria, so they had a vested interest in curbing the influence of postcolonial states in the international sphere. Where the Asian and African states saw the possibility
of a non-aligned third world, Britain saw the emergence of a vindictive Afro-Asian bloc which
might seek to revenge itself against past colonial oppressors. In general British leaders were
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having conniptions. One self aware Foreign Ministry official said of the conference that
Bandung would present an opportunity to discuss “problems affecting international sovereignty,
racism and colonialism, on all of which the conclusions are likely to be embarrassing to us.”108
A joint declaration between Britain and Australia (which wanted no part of the conference
despite being a pacific nation and thus could have been invited) called the conference
“mischievous.”109 What exactly they sought to imply by that statement is tough to parse out, but
it speaks to the ill-will that western nations regarded Bandung with.
While Britain and France were anxious and incensed at the possibility of a post-colonial
Afro-Asian bloc, the United States had other concerns stemming from the conference. Secretary
Dulles was attuned to the anxieties of Britain and France, but viewed the post-colonial nations
with “benevolent indifference.”110 It should have been clear at this point that the end of
colonialism was inevitable, and so the United States was not too concerned about that aspect of
the conference. However, that is not to say that the United States was supportive of the
conference. As it always did in this era, the United States had communism on the mind.
The State department rightly viewed the conference as a formative event for the new
nations of Africa and Asia. Like the 29 attendees, they saw it as a space to foster co-operation
and good intentions, and realized that China’s attendance posed problems in this regard. Dulles
was worried that China would utilize the conference as an opportunity to “enhance the
communist prestige in the area and weaken the west.”111 He further elaborated that the
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conference would certainly act as an “excellent propaganda opportunity.”112 So the United States
was more concerned with the enhancement of Chinese status and the possibility of a Afro-Asian
bloc was only worthy of concern if China was at its head.
The United States and Britain actively sought to undermine the smooth operation of the
conference. They hoped to derail it by providing pro-western attendees such as Turkey, Pakistan,
and the Philippines with specific instruction on how to address certain issues which might be
brought up at the conference. These included positions on what was referred to as communist
colonialism, clearly placed on the agenda by the United States and meant to agitate fears that
western colonial oppression might be replaced by Chinese communist colonialism, and religious
freedom, which the UK and US hoped might drive wedges between the disparate nations.113 The
goal from the United States perspective was to embarrass China, to make them a peripheral
figure at the conference, and negate their ability to influence proceedings in doing so.
China’s very inclusion at the conference was a topic of debate amongst some attendees.
Probably acting on suggestions from the United States, Turkey protested China’s invitation to
Bandung.114 But India’s Jawaharlal Nehru, who took on a leadership role in the organization of
the conference, fought for Chinese inclusion. He recognized that no third world could exist
without Chinese backing.115 Bandung was a watershed moment in Chinese foreign policy in a
subtle yet important manner: it was the first international conference in which China acted alone,
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without the input and support of the Soviet Union.116 It represents the first true instance of the
realization of the long held goal of Chinese self sufficiency in foreign policy, and one scholar
argues that it “saw the emergence of China as a great Asian power and not merely as an isolated
partner of Russia.”117
The Chinese delegation at Bandung was once again headed by Zhou Enlai, who proved
himself an exceedingly capable figure at Geneva. From the outset, he was a man in the wars.
His role at Bandung was under question from nations such as Turkey, and Turkey as well as
others had been instructed to undermine his position at every opportunity, in public declarations
and at closed meetings. Other nations such as Indonesia had faced small communist uprisings in
the recent past, and so were apprehensive towards Zhou. The world had been lead to believe that
Zhou was at the conference to garner support for Chinese communist claims to Taiwan, and
expected that Zhou would use the meeting as a springboard for Chinese ambitions.118
Zhou defied expectations. Richard Wright, present at the conference in a journalistic
capacity, writes that “Communism at Bandung was conspicuous for its shyness, its coyness, its
bland smile and glad hand for everyone.”119 Wright elaborates that Zhou “moved among the
delegates with the utmost friendliness and reserve, listening to all arguments with patience, and
turning the other cheek when receiving ideological slaps.”120 Rather than the combative, agenda
driven promoter of Communism that was expected to make waves at Bandung, Zhou played at
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benevolence. When Turkey attempted to paint China satellite extension of Soviet ambitions,
Zhou turned these concerns aside by articulating a commitment to state sovereignty and the noninterference of western powers in Asian and African affairs.121 When questioned about Chinese
ambitions vis-a-vis Taiwan, Zhou was diplomatic. He stated that “The will of the Chinese people
to liberate their own territory Taiwan and the coastal islands is a just one.”122 However, China
would not problematize Taiwan at the Bandung Conference because in doing so “our conference
wold be dragged into disputes… without any solution.”123
It was a masterful maneuver: Zhou backed up his benevolent stance with action. He
would not use Bandung as an opportunity to gather allies in the fight to reclaim Taiwan because
he prioritized the smooth operation of the conference. Zhou’s benevolent attitude and
willingness to table Chinese foreign policy concerns with an eye towards the conference’s
smooth running gained him admirers. One pro-western delegate, speaking to Richard Wright on
the condition of anonymity said of Zhou that “I’m as violently opposed to communism as ever.
But I trust this man.”124
That is not to say that Zhou’s tremendously effective benevolence was not without
reasoning. He seemed to have recognized that the pump was not primed for the Bandung
Conference to act as a space within which China might further concrete goals. Zhou recognized
that the too much separated the disparate nations of Africa and Asia for such bold actions as
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building support for an invasion of Taiwan or sponsorship of Communist uprisings. So he used
the conference as a means to build goodwill towards China, and attempted to identify the
struggles of his nation with those of the nations at the conference. Building on the Geneva
Conference, Zhou sought to create a reputation for China as a willing opponent of Western
influence in Asia and Africa, an ant-imperialist ally of new nations. “We Asian and African
countries, China included, are all backward economically and culturally. Insomuch as our AsianAfrican conference does not exclude anybody, why couldn’t we ourselves understand each other
and enter into friendly co-operation?”125 It is a brilliant move that cost Zhou nothing, and gained
him the respect and admiration of the conference attendees. He had successfully engendered
amongst the attendees not just passive acceptance of China, but a begrudging respect and
admiration for his goodwill. He had proved western fears about the conference as springboard
for Chinese ambitions both true and false; Zhou would not make concrete proposals, he offered
no mutual defense pacts, no programs of industrialization. Rather, he preached tolerance,
assured one and all that China stood behind them, and offered an open hand rather than a closed
fist. The pump was not primed for the promotion of Chinese foreign policy goals throughout
Asian and Africa before the conference. But Zhou’s benevolence and refusal to prioritize
Chinese goals at the conference had won him respect and support with which he could build. He
had established a bridgehead into Asian and African politics, and positioned China not as
aggressive communist state, but open handed friend and ally of post colonial regimes. It is a
brilliant move that surely enhanced China’s prestige and status to a new height.
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Practical Effects of Goodwill and Status Earned at Bandung

For a nation to be on good terms with its neighbors does provide some inherent benefits.
It can be said to expedite interstate negotiation and problem solving. But what of concrete
benefits to China that can be related directly to the Bandung Conference? The most obvious are
to examine would be an increase in Chinese international trade, which could be linked to
international standing. International trade was one aspect of the Bandung Conference that Zhou
Enlai made sure to stress, although sparingly. Zhou had briefly alluded to the “urgent need of a
peaceful international environment for the development of our independent and sovereign
economy” and his hope for an increase in trade between the nations present at Bandung.126
Bandung could be said to have created the international environment for trade between Asian and
African states, but was this opportunity capitalized on by the Chinese?
Quantitative information on Chinese trade from 1949 to 1979 is sparse: from the years
between 1966 and 1978 there is almost no data at all, so it is at times difficult to determine the
long term economic effects of the Bandung Conference, if any. But a cursory examination of
surface level economic indicators such as annual GDP growth and net imports and exports and
tend to paint a picture of a Chinese economy unchanged by Bandung . Average annual growth
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rate for the value of imports entering the country between 1952 and 1964 remained steady at 4%
per annum.127 Exports grew at 6% annually in that same time period.128 So the value of both
imports and exports grew at a steady but unremarkable rate, and showed no statistically relevant
signs of change following the Bandung Conference. Certainly, these numbers do not compare
favorably with China’s staggering growth in the 1970s or 1990s. GDP growth remained
relatively flat. So it cannot be said that the international ties that were forged at the Bandung
Conference stimulated Chinese international trade to any large degree.
Or maybe not. A quick glance paints an imperfect picture; closer examination of what
data is available reveals a Chinese economy changed in subtle but distinct and relevant ways.
Although the monetary value of Chinese imports and exports remained steady from 1952-1964,
the actual goods being traded changed dramatically in this time period, and reflect a shift in
focus of the Chinese economy.
The Chinese economy post 1949 was modeled after the Soviet Union; it was an industrial
economy that practiced import substitution and sought to be self sufficient industrially.129 In
other words, China sought to produce inside the country what might otherwise have been bought
outside it. This is not an unusual course of action for a relatively poor nation in the mid 20th
century, but it shrinks a nation’s role in the global economy. It has less goods to sell abroad and
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opts to import as few goods as possible. As a result, China’s share of global trade shrunk
marginally from 1936 to 1949.130 These policies were walked back from 1952 to 1964.
In 1952, China’s primary imports were industrial machinery and metals imported from
the Soviet Union, of which machinery consisted of 20% of their total imports, while industrial
metals account for 15%.131 The goal was the rapid industrialization of the Chinese economy.
China did not import many raw goods such as cereals and rice for public consumption, or textile
fibers for commercial use.132 China’s primary exports were fruits, vegetables, and nuts, which
combined accounted for 30% of Chinese exports.133
So in 1952 Chinese imports were aimed at industrial processes and its exports were raw
goods. In 1964 the opposite was true. Cereal imports comprised 30% of Chinese imports by
164, just nine years after Bandung.134 Industrial machines and metals fell from 35% to 15%.
Textile fibers rose from 5% to 15%.
At the same time, the exports of the nation experienced a similar shift. Fruits, nuts, and
made up just 8% of exports in 1964. The most stark change in the economy came in the form of
a rise in manufactured clothing and processed textiles; just 4% of Chinese exports in 1952, they
rose to 28% of exports in 1964.135 These trends indicate that China, from the years between
1952 and 1964 experienced a significant change in character of its economy. The goods it
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imported and exported changed significantly. It shifted from an unindustrialized economy which
focused on import substitution and the production of goods meant for consumption within the
country to a more modern, interconnected economy. An economy that imports raw goods such
as foodstuffs or cotton and exports finished goods such as clothing and machinery is productive
and lucrative. So why don’t we see an overall rise in Chinese GDP?

A Change in Trading Partners— Geneva and Bandung

Following the Bandung and Geneva conferences, China experienced a rapid shift from an
import substitution economy whose chief imports were industrial machinery, to a producer and
exporter of manufactured goods and importer of foodstuffs and raw materials. It is also around
this time, 1962 to be exact, that China’s gross exports began to outweigh its gross imports,
setting China on its present course as net exporter of goods. The Bandung and Geneva
conferences were instrumental in this change because they allowed China to trade more easily
with nations other than the Soviet Union. Their initial model of import substitution was forced
on them, but circumstances dictated it. Their only significant trading partners were the Soviet
Union and its satellites in Europe, and so Chinese trade was bound to the needs of the Soviet
Union. The USSR lacked produce but possessed an abundance of industrial machinery— and so
went trade between the two nations. The Bandung and Geneva conferences, at least in theory,
should have provided China with more options for international trade. Not just in terms of the
goods to be traded, but also who those goods can be traded with.
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One fact finding report commissioned by the CIA Intelligence Advisory Committee
declassified in 2001 found that in 1955, 46% of all Chinese exports (measured by the monetary
value of the exports) were sent to the USSR.136 A further 31% of Chinese exports reached North
Korea, Mongolia, or USSR satellites in Europe.137 All told, 77% of all Chinese goods exported
in the year of the Bandung Conference reached a Communist nation. Trade with America was
almost nonexistent, trade with Western European nations such as France and West Germany
accounted for just 6% of exports, and trade with Southeast Asian nations such as Indonesia and
India made up just 5% of total exports.138 Imports followed the same broad trend: China mostly
traded with fellow Communist nations. Part of this phenomena can be explained by China’s
desire to rapidly industrialize— the Soviet Union was an ideal partner to provide complex
machinery, which made up nearly 35% of total Chinese imports from the USSR. But it is also
true that the opportunity to trade with other nations was simply not there. Many nations in
Western Europe had never seen China as a viable trading partner before Geneva, and saw no
business to be done with China. A great deal of post colonial regimes in Asia had never been in
control of their international trade and had no positive relationship with the Chinese state, which
dictated Chinese the destinations of exports and imports.
The post Bandung and Geneva era of Chinese foreign trade show a marked increase in
trade with non Communist nations. Trade with Western European nations such as France, Italy,
and the United Kingdom rose dramatically. Imports from France to China rose between 1955
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and 1962 from 28 million dollars worth of goods to 41 million.139 Trade with England doubled
in that same time period, from 21 million dollars worth of goods to 52 million.140
Trade with Southeast Asian nations rose dramatically, mostly in the sector of exports.
Chinese exports to Southeast Asian nations in many cases doubled or tripled between 1952 and
1964. Exports to Japan nearly doubled from 80 million dollars worth of goods to 150 in 1964.141
Exports to Malaysia, India and Singapore doubled as well. So we see a marked and statistically
significant rise in trade with both Southeast Asian nations as well as Western European nations,
in terms of both exports and imports.
Despite building relations with new trading partners and a general increase in exports,
Chinese GDP did not rise as it might be expected to under these conditions. This is because
trade with the Soviet Union in this era either remained stagnant or dropped markedly depending
on the year. Imports from the Soviet Union fell from close to one billion dollars worth of goods
in 1955 to just 200 million in 1962.142 The value of exports to the USSr dropped more modestly,
from 645 million to 515 million.143 This explains to some extent why Chinese GDP remained
flat. Despite an increase in trade with alternative partners which might lead one to expect a large
jump both in total GDP and GDP growth per year, the loss of trade with the Soviet Union
balanced out the growth in other sectors. It must be mentioned that around this time relations
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between the Soviet Union and China began to deteriorate, eventually culminating in the SinoSoviet split. Had such a split occurred before trade with non Soviet bloc nations was made
possible by the work done by Chinese dignitaries at the Geneva and Bandung conferences, the
Chinese economy might have tanked during this period rather than stagnated. The increase in
exports and imports with European and Southeast Asian nations essentially took the place of
trade with the USSR; this can be attributed in some small part to the Geneva and Bandung
conferences, which both had a positive effect on Chinese diplomatic and trade relations with
states such as Indonesia, the UK, and Japan.
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Conclusion

What lessons about the behavior of states denied legal recognition can be gleaned from a
close examination of Communist China? Firstly, that a nation in such a scenario must seek out
allies, but be wary of becoming drawn into a situation resembling satellite status. Although the
USSR probably did not play as active a role in forcing China’s entry into the Korean War as
certain scholars would claim, the Korean War still serves as a cautionary tale for unrecognized
nations seeking alliances with great power states. Had China been formally recognized in this
era by the United States and others, perhaps its border insecurities might not have been so
pressing as to merit war. After all, non-recognized states do not have the same legal status as
recognized ones and violations of their sovereignty are common. The Korean War also led China
into a mutually antagonistic relationship with the United States, harming its chances of
recognition both by the United States and its allies (Britain notwithstanding ).
At the armistice talks at Panmunjong, the Chinese were chiefly concerned with righting
historical wrongs enacted against the Chinese people by Western Imperialist powers, while the
United States hoped simply to leave Korea in an expedient manner. But it is at the armistice
talks that Chinese leadership recognized the potential for international conferences to act as a
vehicle for the enhancement of Chinese status, which it hoped to enlarge at the Geneva
Conference. China argued that the very fact of its presence at the negotiating table with the
United States and other great powers such as the UK and France was a tacit acknowledgment of
China’s status being close to great power level. Zhou Enlai was able to argue that China’s
actions at Panmunjon and admittedly small role in the actual negotiations at Geneva were
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representative of China as the leader of the emergent third world. He positioned China as enemy
of imperialism and American imperialism in general. The status earned at Geneva and the
goodwill that Zhou garnered at Bandung were put to good use; following Geneva and Bandung,
China saw a marked increase in trade with nations present at both those conferences. This
increase in trade and mutual relations must be considered as a success of Chinese foreign policy,
and in this time period China additionally became formally recognized by some European states
such as Great Britain and Finland, and many Asian states such as India and Indonesia.
It can be deduced from China’s case that in the absence of UN membership or formal
diplomatic recognition, international conferences play an important role in the diplomacy of unrecognized states. Without UN membership or diplomatic relations at the charge d’affairs level,
both of which China lacked, international conferences are just about the only venue for status
enhancement and trade agreements. As such, it must be noted that participation international
conferences should be a priority for un-recognized states. Even in such cases as the Geneva
Conference when few practical gains are made at the negotiating table, a state must capitalize on
the opportunity to enhance its status that negotiating with Great Powers or even neighboring
states of equal or lesser status represents. The enlargement of China’s status can be linked to its
gains in foreign trade, and so it must be said that the enhancement of a non-recognized state’s
status through international conferences and other venues of negotiation such as armistice deals
has concrete and desirable benefits, and may be utilized as a strategy to gain beneficial
membership in the society of states without first procuring formal recognition.
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